Tax authorities worldwide are implementing voluntary disclosure schemes to recover tax on o¤shore investments. Such schemes are typically designed retrospectively following the bulk acquisition of information on o¤shore holdings, such as the recent "Paradise" and "Panama" papers. They o¤er an opportunity for a¤ected taxpayers to make a voluntary disclosure, with reduced …ne rates for truthful disclosure. We characterize the taxpayer/tax authority game with and without a scheme and show that a scheme increases net expected tax revenue, decreases illegal o¤shore investment, increases onshore investment, and could either increase or decrease total o¤shore investment (legal plus illegal).
Introduction
An estimated eight percent of the global wealth of households is held in tax havens, much, though by no means all, of which goes unreported (Zucman, 2013) . The loss of tax receipts due to o¤shore tax evasion by individuals for the US alone has been estimated as $30-40 billion per annum (Gravelle, 2009) . In recent years, data breaches have allowed tax authorities around the world to acquire information on the o¤shore investments of thousands of individuals. To recover any tax owing on these investments, tax authorities have, in many instances, o¤ered a¤ected taxpayers a one-o¤ and time-limited opportunity to make a voluntary disclosure through a bespoke facility giving overt incentives for honesty (usually in the form of a lower …ne rate). We term schemes of this form Incentivized O¤shore Voluntary Disclosure Schemes (IOVDS), or just "schemes". The net revenues arising from such schemes have been signi…cant: in 2009 a United States (US) scheme netted $3.4 billion (GAO, 2013) and a United Kingdom (UK) scheme netted nearly £ 500 million (Treasury Committee, 2012: 14) . The UK scheme is estimated to have cost £ 6 million to administer (Committee of Public Accounts, 2008: 9) , implying a return of 67:1. This compares favorably with reported yield/cost ratios in the UK of around eight-to-one for traditional audit-based enforcement programs (HMRC, 2006) .
1 Moreover, such schemes typically raise revenue faster than do approaches relying on (often lengthy) audits. Yet, in o¤ering incentives for voluntary disclosure, recent empirical evidence suggests that incentivized schemes might simply encourage illegal o¤shore investment in the …rst place. We shed light on this concern.
In this paper we appraise the use of o¤shore disclosure schemes using game theoretic tools. The model has two key features. First, we note that disclosure schemes are typically implemented in direct response to an information leak. By the time of the information leak, however, the act of illegal o¤shore evasion has already taken place. As it cannot retrospectively in ‡uence the illegal act, the best a tax authority can do is seek to recover any money owed. The importance of this observation lies in the fact that, in implementing incentivized schemes to e¢ ciently recover tax owed from past evasion, the tax authority may inadvertently change the incentives for future acts of o¤shore evasion. Second, we recognize that there can be legitimate economic reasons for holding money in o¤shore accounts. As well as potential pecuniary bene…ts in the form of higher rates of interest than available in the domestic country, o¤shore investment may also o¤er non-pecuniary bene…ts: o¤shore providers are known to o¤er greater convenience and sophistication, presumably as they face lighter regulatory controls as compared with their onshore counterparts (Helm, 1997: 414) .
2 One of the most colorful groups of people known to use o¤shore accounts for legitimate business 1 The ratio of 8:1 is based on the estimated yield/cost ratio for self-assessment non-business enquiry work in 2005-06 of 7.8-to-one. 2 Relative to their onshore counterparts in the US, Helm argues that o¤shore funds have greater ‡exibility and less procedural delays in changing the nature, structure, or operation of their products, and they face fewer investment restrictions, short-term trading limitations, capital structure requirements, and governance provisions. For evidence on the impact of these di¤erences on the behavior of onshore and o¤shore …nancial institutions see Kim and Wei (2002). reasons are professional poker players, who must transact regularly in many world currencies (see O'Reilly, 2007) . Accordingly, not all taxpayers who appear in data on o¤shore holdings owe tax.
In order to appraise the impact of disclosure schemes we …rst model the strategic interaction between taxpayers and the tax authority in the absence of a scheme. 3 We then introduce a scheme into the model and compare the results. A taxpayer can decide to invest an exogenous lump-sum either onshore or o¤shore. An onshore investment must be made legally, but an o¤shore investment may be made either legal or illegally. If a taxpayer invests o¤shore, the investment is subsequently observed by the tax authority with a positive probability. In the absence of a scheme, if a taxpayer's o¤shore investment is observed, the tax authority can audit (at a cost) with a chosen probability. An equilibrium of this game is ine¢ cient to the extent that the tax authority struggles to achieve a credible threat to audit, owing to its inability to distinguish between legal and illegal o¤shore investments. In the presence of a scheme, the tax authority chooses an incentivized …ne rate that will apply to liabilities disclosed within the scheme, and taxpayers decide whether or not to make a disclosure under the scheme. If a taxpayer does not make a disclosure the tax authority audits with a chosen probability. If a taxpayer does make a disclosure they can either disclose their o¤shore investment to be illegal and pay a …ne at the incentivized rate, or disclose their investment as legal. The tax authority audits those taxpayers who disclose their o¤shore investment to be legal with a chosen probability (for an illegal investment might be falsely disclosed as legal).
We …nd that the introduction of a disclosure scheme induces fewer taxpayers to invest o¤-shore, and fewer taxpayers to invest o¤shore illegally, with the implication that the number of taxpayers investing onshore increases. When we consider aggregate investment amounts the picture is similar, but whereas the number of taxpayers investing o¤shore unambiguously falls, the total amount that is invested o¤shore may increase or decrease. Because aggregate illegal o¤shore investment falls, however, if aggregate o¤shore investment is observed to increase following the introduction of a scheme, the entire e¤ect is driven by increased legal o¤shore investment. Thus, our model suggests that empirical evidence pointing to increased o¤shore investment following the introduction of a scheme is not evidence that such schemes generate additional o¤shore evasion. Tax authorities also bene…t from schemes: expected net revenue increases due to the additional voluntary compliance that occurs when some taxpayers switch from investing o¤shore illegally to either investing onshore, or to o¤shore legally. Consistent with the design of schemes in the UK, the model predicts that the optimal scheme o¤ers the lowest allowable …ne rate permitted in legislation for truthful disclosure within the scheme.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 explains gives some historical context on the use and design of disclosure schemes in the o¤shore context, and section 3 casts our contribution in the context of the existing literature. Section 4 presents the model, which is developed in the absence of a sceme in section 5, and in the presence of a scheme in section 6. Section 7 gives a comparative analysis of the consequences of the introduction of a scheme for investment behavior, welfare, and for tax revenue; and Section 8 concludes.
O¤shore Disclosure Schemes
Bulk leakages of o¤shore holdings data in recent decades have stimulated use of voluntary disclosure schemes by tax authorities around the world. Leakages have occurred through a number of channels. First, some tax authorities are aggressively exploiting legal powers that impel …nancial organizations to reveal tax-related information. One of the …rst IOVDS, the 2007 O¤shore Disclosure Facility (ODF), was implemented in the UK following legal action by the tax authority to force …ve major UK banks to disclose details of the o¤shore accounts held by their customers. The ODF o¤ered a¤ected taxpayers time-limited access to a ten percent …ne rate (the minimum allowable penalty under UK civil legislation) if they made a full disclosure. Ireland (2004) and Australia (2009) have also implemented schemes following similar legal action.
Second, tax authorities are cooperating with whistleblowers. In 2009 the IRS learned details of the o¤shore accounts of a number of US citizens with the Swiss bank UBS. It launched the O¤shore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP) in the same year and later implemented the O¤shore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative in 2011. 4 The UK implemented two schemesthe New Disclosure Opportunity and the Liechtenstein Disclosure Facility -in response to information relating to (i) 100 UK citizens with funds in Liechtenstein; and (ii) all British clients of HSBC in Jersey (Watt et al., 2012) . A list of o¤shore account holders of HSBC's Geneva branch -seized by French police in 2009 -is still the subject of investigation by tax authorities worldwide, as are further lists published by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (the "Paradise" and "Panama" papers) and the Center for Public Integrity (Center for Public Integrity, 2013).
5 Italy, France, Canada and Hungary are also known to have implemented disclosure schemes in response to information acquisitions (OECD, 2010) .
Third, tax authorities are exploiting information arising from new legislation, such as occurred around the 2003 European Savings Directive (European Union, 2003) . Last, tax authorities are taking steps to improve international cooperation through the signing of tax information exchange agreements, with the G20 countries leading in this regard. 6 The creation in 2013 of an OECD Common Reporting Standard (OECD, 2013) To our knowledge, the only theoretical analysis dedicated to IOVDS is found in Langenmayr (2017) . In her model, the tax authority is a …rst mover, deciding on the incentivized …ne rate before taxpayers decide whether or not to evade tax. While the tax authority moving …rst is a good representation of the situation in, e.g., Germany, which has handled o¤shore data acquisitions through standing generic mechanisms for voluntary disclosure, our analysis (in which the tax authority moves last) is focused on the approach in the UK and US, where bespoke, and seemingly reactive, schemes have been introduced following speci…c data leakages. 8 Langenmayr shows that, with the tax authority as a …rst mover, the introduction of a scheme increases the number of taxpayers who evade tax. Note, however, that this e¤ect arises at the discretion of the tax authority as a consequence of its revenue maximizing strategy. That is, in equilibrium, the tax authority "permits" an increase in evasion as the loss of revenue through voluntary compliance is more than recouped through additional …ne payments. 9 In our model the tax authority takes evasion behavior as …xed, for the crime has already been committed at the point at which the scheme is designed. In this context, these apparently perverse incentives on the part of the tax authority do not arise. Rather, we …nd that the introduction of a scheme unambiguously reduces illegal o¤shore evasion, albeit the total amount of o¤shore investment (legal and illegal) may either increase or decrease.
Our analysis relates to a number of other literatures. We connect to a literature on the use by tax authorities of pre-audit settlements in which taxpayers can acquire full (e.g., Chu, 1990; Glen Ueng and Yang, 2001) or partial (Goerke, 2015) insurance from audit risk. These settlements are shown to yield a Pareto improvement relative to random auditing as 6 Within eight months of the G20 summit of April 2009 tax havens had signed more than 300 treaties (Johannesen and Zucman, 2014) . The UK has conducted several recent IOVDS using information obtained in this way. These include the 2009 Liechtenstein Disclosure Facility, and three schemes aimed at its dependencies The Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey. See Konrad and Stolper (2016) for a more general model of the problem of coordinating aginst tax havens.
7 For more on the economic impact of FATCA see Dharmapala (2016) . 8 In assuming the tax authority moves last, our model has similarities with, e.g., Graetz et al. (1986) . Di¤erent from this analysis, however, we assume that, for the tax authority to go to the trouble of carrying out an audit, it must be strictly gainful in expectation. This leads to tax authority to adopt a pure strategy, whereas Graetz et al. consider a mixed strategy for the tax authority. 9 For another context in which a revenue-maximizing tax authority does not maximize voluntary compliance see Rablen (2014) .
(i) the tax authority captures the positive risk premium of a risk averse taxpayer and (ii) the tax authority conducts fewer random audits. Such audit settlement schemes, however, rely on the tax authority moving …rst, before the taxpayer makes the evasion choice. They are, therefore, not directly applicable in our framework. It is also notable that, even were we to allow the tax authority to move …rst, such settlement procedures would not induce a Pareto improvement in our framework. We consider risk neutral taxpayers, so the tax authority is not able to extract a positive risk premium; and we assume the tax authority audits optimally with and without a scheme, which rules out random auditing. In particular, in our model, the tax authority does not gain from a reduction in the number of audits it performs per se, as it only ever audits when it is strictly gainful in expectation to do so.
A further important feature of the pre-audit settlement literature discussed above is that it fails to take into account the potential for the settlement to a¤ect the incentives for taxpayers to evade in the …rst place. As our model examines both the initial decision by the taxpayer to evade, as well as the taxpayer's subsequent disclosure decision, it is in this sense more closely associated with the literature investigating tax amnesties, by which we mean voluntary disclosure schemes run in the absence of new information, which nevertheless o¤er taxpayers reduced penalties if they wish to disclose an illegal o¤shore investment. Tax amnesties are analyzed using theoretical (e.g., Andreoni, 1991; Franzoni, 2000; Macho-Stadler et al., 1993; Malik and Schwab, 1991; Stella, 1991) , empirical (e.g., Alm and Beck, 1993) and experimental (Alm et al., 1990) methods. The taxpayers in our model would never disclose under an amnesty, but may make a disclosure under a scheme. The reason is that the tax authority learns new information between the taxpayer choosing to invest o¤shore illegally and the taxpayer being o¤ered the opportunity to disclose under a scheme. In this way, voluntary disclosure takes place in the shadow of a credible threat of sanctions for non-disclosure. In contrast, an amnesty provides no new information to the taxpayer, so rational and fully-informed taxpayers will never participate (Andreoni, 1991; Malik and Schwab, 1991) . 10 Whereas the literature has cast doubt on the desirability to tax authorities of amnesties, our analysis of voluntary disclosure schemes arrives at more positive conclusions.
Our work also connects to the literature on law enforcement with self-reporting (e.g., Kaplow and Shavell, 1994) . In this literature truthful disclosure is induced by allowing those who report to pay a sanction equal to the certainty equivalent of the expected sanctions they would otherwise face by not self-reporting. While our model also utilizes this insight, the key di¤erence between our model and this literature is that the tax authority takes evasion behavior as given when setting the scheme parameters, for the evasion has already occurred. The insights of Kaplow and Shavell are su¢ cient to establish that, if a tax authority can precommit to a scheme before taxpayer's make their evasion (investment) choice, then a scheme can always be made unambiguously bene…cial: it can be chosen to lower enforcement costs while holding incentives to commit evasion …xed. But, if the tax authority moves after the crime is committed, as we suppose, it is unclear that the desirable properties of selfreporting when the law enforcer moves …rst, are retained.
A further related literature is that on optimal auditing in the presence of signals (e.g., Scotchmer, 1987; Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 2002; Bigio and Zilberman, 2011) . Under a scheme both the very act of making a disclosure, as well as its content, are signals the tax authority observes before deciding whether to audit. Last, as the ability of tax authorities to extract revenue from whistleblower data in ‡uences the degree to which they should incentivize such behavior, our …ndings inform the literature on the optimal incentivization of whistleblowing (Yaniv, 2001 ) and complement studies that analyze the e¤ects on compliance of the presence of potential whistleblowers (Mealem et al., 2010; Bazart et al., 2014; Johannesen and Stolper, 2017) .
Model
In this section we model IOVDS as a strategic interaction between taxpayers, who can invest either onshore or o¤shore, and the domestic tax authority.
Each taxpayer i belonging to the set T receives a lump-sum w i > 0, unobserved by the tax authority. The lump-sum is distributed across taxpayers according to the function W : [w; w] 2 R >0 7 ! (0; 1). Each taxpayer should, by law, declare the lump-sum for taxation at the marginal rate 2 (0; 1). We assume, however, that taxpayers have three possible actions (i) invest the lump-sum o¤shore without declaring it for domestic taxation (illegal o¤shore investment); (ii) declare the lump-sum for domestic taxation and invest the remaining amount [1 ] w o¤shore (legal o¤shore investment); or (iii) declare the lump-sum for domestic taxation and invest the remainder onshore. Amounts invested o¤shore earn a rate of return r OF F > 0, and amounts invested onshore earn a rate of return r ON > 0. Taxpayers consume the investment (plus interest earned), upon its maturity.
We shall assume, for simplicity, that interest income accruing from investment is untaxed. That is, we focus on the evasion of tax on the source capital rather than the evasion ("sheltering") of interest income. As well as giving tractability, we note that the former is of greater economic signi…cance: the amount of source capital is typically many times the annual interest ‡ow such that only when undeclared interest has accrued over many years does the tax liability from this source become of a comparable magnitude to that on the undeclared capital.
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As discussed in the introduction, o¤shore investment may have both pecuniary and nonpecuniary bene…ts. We capture the former through the di¤erential rates of return, r ON and r OF F , and the latter, for each taxpayer i, by a parameter b i > 0: b i < 1 signi…es that the non-pecuniary bene…ts from investing o¤shore exceed those from investing onshore, while b i > 1 signi…es the reverse. b i is independent of w i , and is distributed across taxpayers according to the function B : R >0 7 ! (0; 1).
An o¤shore investment (legal or illegal) is subsequently observed by the tax authority with probability p 2 (0; 1), where this probability re ‡ects the possibility that, e.g., a whistleblower comes forward. The underlying inference problem for the tax authority is as follows: if it observes an o¤shore investment of y, this could be the illegal investment of a taxpayer with lump-sum w = y or the legal investment of a taxpayer with lump-sum w = y= [1 ] . Thus, observing an o¤shore investment w does not permit the tax authority to know whether the investment was made legally (i.e., after tax) or illegally (i.e., before tax).
In the event that o¤shore investments are observed, the tax authority can spend an amount c > 0 to perform a veri…cation audit that reveals the nature of the taxpayer's o¤shore investment with certainty. If a tax liability is detected by an audit, the tax authority can levy a …ne on the undeclared tax at a rate f 2 [f ; f ], where these upper and lower bounds are interpreted as being speci…ed in legislation. Standard arguments (e.g., Kaplow and Shavell, 1994) ensure that a revenue-maximizing tax authority will choose f = f . At the …ne rate f , the amount a taxpayer who has invested an amount y o¤shore illegally must pay if audited is denoted by
(1)
To simplify aspects of the analysis we make the following assumptions:
Assumption A0 may be interpreted as requiring the investment amount w to be su¢ ciently large that, conditional on observing the investment, it is gainful in expectation for the tax authority to audit. Consistent with this assumption, observed o¤shore investments are typically large. 12 Moreover, to the extent that some of o¤shore holdings are too insigni…cant to be gainfully investigated, such holdings can be almost costlessly screened out by the tax authority. Assumption A1 implies that, at the maximum …ne rate, f , it is not gainful (in expectation) to invest o¤shore illegally if the tax authority, conditional on observing the investment, will audit with certainty. Conversely, at the minimum …ne rate speci…ed under legislation, f , it is gainful to invest o¤shore illegally even if, conditional on observing the investment, the tax authority will audit with certainty. If the former inequality is not satis…ed, illegal o¤shore investment is a one-way bet, for it pays even when the tax authority's enforcement is maximal. If the latter inequality is not met, the tax authority's enforcement is so strong that it can eliminate all o¤shore investment in the presence of a scheme.
Both taxpayers and the tax authority are assumed to be risk neutral. Taxpayers behave so as to maximize expected consumption and, for simplicity, we de-emphasize the intertemporal dimension of consumption by assuming a time preference rate of unity. The tax authority behaves so as to maximize revenue (comprising voluntary compliance, tax recovered by audit, and …nes) net of enforcement costs. Denote the expected consumption from choosing to invest onshore by C ON , from investing o¤shore legally by C L , and from investing o¤shore illegally by C I . Hence, as taxpayers maximize expected consumption, we may partition fw i ; b i g-space as follows:
Note that these de…nitions imply OF F = L [ I . Similarly, we may partition the set T into those taxpayers that invest onshore, o¤shore legally, and o¤shore illegally,
Conditional on having chosen to invest o¤shore, the probability that a taxpayer who has invested an amount y chooses to do so illegally is denoted = (y) 2 [0; 1]. When the tax authority chooses its enforcement parameters (y) is already determined, though its value is not observed by the tax authority. We suppose, however, that the tax authority forms a (rational) expectation of this quantity: its prior is of the form~ (y) = (y) +", where E(") = 0, such that E(~ (y)) = (y).
No Scheme
In order to appraise the use of disclosure schemes, we now model the "do nothing"benchmark case in which the tax authority does not o¤er a scheme (NS). The game in the absence of a scheme is set out in Figure 1 . At the outset, nature determines each taxpayer's lump-sum, w i , and his/her level of non-pecuniary bene…t, b i , but this action is unobserved by the tax authority. Next taxpayers make an investment choice as described previously. Taxpayers who invest o¤shore have their investment subsequently observed by the tax authority with probability p 2 (0; 1). 13 The distribution function of observed o¤shore investments is denoted by Y ( ). If o¤shore holdings are not observed by the tax authority, any illegal o¤shore 13 We assume here, for simplicity, that the tax authority acquires o¤shore data at zero cost, as was indeed the case in many of the schemes discussed in the Introduction. Even when payments were made, the amounts involved -where known -appear relatively modest in relation to the revenue generated. Bradley Birkenfeld, a UBS employee who acted as an IRS informer, received a payment of $104 million, but in the context of investment goes undetected with probability one, and the game ends. If o¤shore holdings are observed by the tax authority, it will audit each o¤shore investment with a probability 2 [0; 1]. Any undeclared liabilities uncovered by an audit are …ned at the rate f . It follows that expected taxpayer consumption is given by
where implicit in this formulation is that the taxpayer must repatriate some of their illegal o¤shore investment to meet any tax and …nes payable as a result of audit, and therefore do not earn interest on this part of their investment.
The expected net revenue the tax authority will generate from the members of T is given by:
where the …rst term is the revenue generated through voluntary compliance, and the second term is the expected net revenue from auditing taxpayers in OF F , R OF F ( ; ), given by
Importantly, however, because the tax authority only observes the realized investment amount y of each member of the set T OF F after those investments have been made, it takes as …xed both the total size of the set of the set T OF F , and its decomposition between taxpayers who have invested o¤shore legally and illegally. Accordingly, choosing to maximize R T ( ; ) becomes equivalent to simply choosing to maximize R OF F ( ; ), i.e., the net revenue from auditing taxpayers in T OF F . Di¤erentiating R OF F ( ; ) with respect to we obtain
Hence, when observing an o¤shore investment of amount y, the tax authority chooses ; 1 otherwise; some $3.4 billion that was eventually raised by the resulting scheme (GAO, 2013). The UK tax authority is reported to have paid a former Liechtenstein bank employee a fee of just £ 100,000 for information regarding more than £ 100 million of o¤shore funds (Oates, 2008) . Clearly, however, any amount paid to acquire information must be set against any tax revenues accruing from the scheme.
where here we adopt the convention that, if the tax authority is indi¤erent between auditing and not-auditing, it does not audit. Expected consumption, conditional on choosing to invest o¤shore, is therefore
For c=Q(f ; w) the taxpayer's payo¤ in (6) is strictly increasing in . At = c=Q(f ; w) the payo¤ C N S OF F jumps downward discretely, due to the associated jump in , and becomes strictly decreasing in thereafter (by A.1). Thus, there exists a maximum at
Substituting (7) into (6) we obtain
The payo¤ in (8) is strictly preferred to the payo¤ from investing onshore in (2) if
Proposition 1 In the absence of a scheme, a taxpayer i 2 T invests o¤shore illegally with probability c Q(f ;w i ) and o¤shore legally with probability
; and invests onshore with probability one otherwise. Figure 3 . The lineb N S (w) demarks the boundary between the sets N S ON and N S OF F : taxpayers falling below the lineb N S (w) invest o¤shore, and mix over doing so legally or illegally, while taxpayers falling above the lineb N S (w) invest onshore. A hallmark of the equilibrium outcome is that, owing to its inability to distinguish between legal and illegal o¤shore investments, the tax authority is only able to cap the propensity for illegal o¤shore investment at (w i ) = c=Q(f ; w i ). Below this propensity it is unable to sustain a credible audit threat.
Proposition 1 is illustrated graphically in

The Scheme
We now suppose the tax authority o¤ers a scheme in the event that o¤shore investments are observed. The game is set out in Figure 2 . The initial hidden action by nature and the subsequent investment decision are modelled in the same way as in the absence of a scheme. If o¤shore investments are observed, however, the tax authority chooses the terms of a scheme it then announces to taxpayers.
14 A taxpayer of type j then chooses to enter or not-enter the scheme. If the taxpayer enters s/he discloses a type d 2 fL; Ig. A taxpayer disclosing d = I accompanies their disclosure with a payment to the tax authority of Q(f ; y), wheref 2 [f ; f ] is termed the "incentivized" …ne rate. A taxpayer disclosing d = L makes no accompanying payment. The tax authority audits the disclosure d = L with probability I 2 [0; 1] and never audits the disclosure d = I. Audited taxpayers have the nature of their o¤shore investment revealed with certainty: if the tax authority reveals a taxpayer to have disclosed falsely it levies a …ne at the rate f . When a taxpayer chooses to not-enter the scheme the tax authority can choose to audit them with probability O 2 [0; 1]. If an illegal investment is veri…ed, the taxpayer is …ned at the rate f O 2 [f ; f ]. Standard arguments ensure that the tax authority will set f O = f .
Owing to the revelation principle, attention may be con…ned to schemes (mechanisms) in which taxpayers disclose truthfully. Consider the subgame that arises when a taxpayer enters the scheme. If an investment is illegal, falsely disclosing d = L results in an expected payment of I Q(f ; y), whereas disclosing d = I results in a sure payment of Q(f ; y). Hence truthful disclosure requiresf to satisfy Q(f ; y) I Q(f ; y). 15 As, in equilibrium, the tax authority will never …nd it optimal to setf below that required to achieve truthful disclosure, it follows that Q(f ; y) = I Q(f ; y):
We now turn to the entry decision. A taxpayer with an illegal o¤shore investment faces a sure payment Q(f ; w) = I Q(f ; w) if they enter the scheme, and an expected payment O Q(f ; w) if they choose to not-enter. We assume that, in the case of perfect indi¤erence, taxpayers enter the scheme. Accordingly, the taxpayer will enter the scheme if O I . A taxpayer with a legal o¤shore investment is indi¤erent between entering and not-entering the scheme, so will enter.
If it observes the set of o¤shore investments the tax authority can again only seek to recover any outstanding revenue. Accordingly, it chooses the parameters of the scheme, { I ; O ;f ; f O }, to maximize R OF F ( I ; O ; y; ), the expected net revenue raised from taxpayers belonging to T OF F . Using the equality in (9) T OF F is given by 14 In practice a tax authority may also face a second choice as to the set of taxpayers to whom it communicates the scheme. For instance, prior to the OVDP in the US, the Swiss authorities agreed to hand the IRS the names of approximately 4,450 US clients with accounts at UBS. The IRS then had the choice of (i) requiring UBS to write to the a¤ected clients informing them that the details of their o¤shore holding had been handed to the IRS; or (ii) requiring UBS to write to a wider set of its clients (up to the set of all UBS clients with o¤shore holdings) informing them that the details of their o¤shore holding might have been handed to the IRS. In actuality, the IRS chose the second option, and -to prevent taxpayers from inferring whether their information had been handed over -negotiated a con…dentiality clause with the Swiss that concealed the criteria by which the accounts were selected until after the OVDP deadline had passed (GAO, 2013) . We abstract from this issue here, but note it as a potentially interesting avenue for future research. 15 If an o¤shore investment is legal, falsely disclosing d = I results in an sure loss of [1 ] Q(f ; y), whereas disclosing d = L results in no loss. Hence, truthful disclosure by taxpayers in T L is assured in equilibrium.
where 1 A takes the value one if condition A is true, and the value zero otherwise. The …rst term in the integral in (10) is the revenue from the proportion (y) of taxpayers with an o¤shore investment of amount y who have invested o¤shore illegally. Here, the min condition acknowledges the taxpayer's endogenous entry decision, as discussed previously. The second term is the cost of auditing. Importantly, for a given y, only the proportion 1 (y) of taxpayers belonging to T OF F who disclose d = L are audited, whereas, in the absence of a scheme, the audit probability (y) applies to all taxpayers belonging to T OF F . The importance of this observation is that, relative to the equilibrium without a scheme, it expands the set of values of for which the tax authority is able to maintain a credible audit threat.
Audit Strategy
We now consider the optimal choice of the audit probabilities f I ; O g. To deduce the optimal choice of { I ; O } we …rst consider the optimal choice of O conditional upon a given I . According to Lemma 1, if it is not gainful in expectation to audit outside the scheme, i.e., c=Q(f ; y), then O = 0. If it is gainful in expectation to audit outside the scheme then, the tax authority sets O such that the taxpayer is made indi¤erent between entering and not-entering the scheme: O = I . Clearly, any choice O > I is also weakly optimal, as all such choices induce taxpayers to enter the scheme. Implicit in Lemma 1 is therefore the assumption that, if the tax authority does not have a unique equilibrium choice of audit probability, it chooses the lowest such probability.
It follows from Lemma 1 that we may rewrite R OF F ( I ; O ; y; ) at the optimal O as
We now di¤erentiate R OF F ( I ; y; ) with respect to I to deduce the optimal audit strategy:
Lemma 2 In the presence of a scheme the net-revenue maximizing audit strategy is to set Proof. Di¤erentiating R OF F ( I ; y; ) with respect to I we obtain that
If is su¢ ciently low, i.e., c[c + Q(f ; y)] 1 then @R OF F ( I ; y; ) =@ I 0, so the tax authority will not audit. It follows that, in this case, R OF F ( I ; y; ) obtains a maximum at the lowest level consistent with the truthtelling restriction Q(f ; y) = I Q(f ; y). Hence
1 . If > c[c+Q(f ; y)] 1 then auditing is strictly gainful, so R OF F ( I ; y; ) achieves a maximum at I = 1. The optimal O corresponding to each value I of is then inferred from Lemma 1.
According to Lemma 2, above a critical level of , the tax authority will audit all taxpayers who enter the scheme and disclose their investment to be legal. Taxpayers with an o¤shore investment indeed enter the scheme, due to the (out of equilibrium) threat to audit with certainty outside the scheme. If the propensity to invest o¤shore illegally falls below the critical value c[c + Q(f ; y)] 1 , however, the tax authority cannot maintain a credible audit threat.
Investment Decision
With the nature of enforcement now determined, we analyze the taxpayer's investment decision. Expected consumption, conditional upon investing o¤shore illegally with probability
For c[c + Q(f ; w)] 1 the taxpayer's payo¤ is strictly increasing in , as the tax authority cannot credibly commit to audit. But for > c[c + Q(f ; w)] 1 the taxpayer's payo¤ becomes strictly decreasing in , as the tax authority will now audit. It follows that C S OF F ( ) obtains a maximum in at
Substituting (12) into (11), equilibrium consumption when investing o¤shore is
The payo¤ C S OF F (w) in (13) is strictly preferred to the payo¤ from investing onshore if
Proposition 2 A taxpayer i 2 T invests o¤shore illegally with probability c c+Q(f ;w i ) and o¤shore legally with probability
; and invests onshore with probability one otherwise.
Proposition 2 is illustrated graphically in Figure 3 . The interpretation is analogous to the no-scheme case, except that it is now the lineb S (w) that demarks the boundary between the sets 
Analysis
Investment and Evasion -Onshore and O¤shore
By comparing the respective equilibria in the absence (Proposition 1) and presence (Proposition 2) of a scheme, we now analyze the consequences of introducing a scheme for both onshore and o¤shore investment volumes, and for the decomposition of o¤shore investments between those that are legal, and those that are illegal.
The expected proportion of taxpayers with lump-sum w who invest o¤shore legally, L (w), and illegally, I (w), are given, respectively, by
where k 2 fN S; Sg, and k is the value of in state k. Hence, in aggregate, the expected proportions of taxpayers choosing each investment type are given by
Expected aggregate onshore and o¤shore investment are given by
where the latter may be further decomposed into its legal and illegal components:
To establish the relative magnitudes of these sets, we …rst prove the following:
Part ( Figure 3 focuses on the extensive margin, part (ii) of Lemma 3 addresses the intensive margin. In the presence of a scheme, the propensity towards illegal o¤shore investment, , falls. With these two …ndings it is straightforward to prove the following:
Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3 focus on the proportion of taxpayers who invest o¤shore with and without a scheme. Part (i) clari…es that the introduction of a scheme induces a set of taxpayers -those with characteristics belonging to the shaded set in Figure 3 -to switch from investing o¤shore to investing onshore. According to part (ii), the introduction of a scheme also unambiguously reduces the proportion of taxpayers who invest o¤shore illegally. As, however, both T OF F and T I shrink, the proportion of taxpayers who invest o¤shore legally could either increase or decrease. In particular, if T I shrinks by more than does T OF F , then T L expands.
Parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 3 are analogous to parts (i) and (ii), but instead focus on aggregate investment. Part (iii) clari…es that onshore investment unambiguously increases with the introduction of a scheme. Interestingly, however, whether o¤shore investment increases or decreases with a scheme is unclear a-priori. According to part (iv), illegal o¤shore investment unambiguously decreases with the introduction of a scheme, but whether legal o¤shore investment increases or decreases is unclear.
Empirically, Langenmayr (2017) . Thus, our model runs counter to the interpretation of Langenmayr's …nding as evidence that the implementation of a disclosure scheme results in increased o¤shore evasion. If o¤shore investment is observed to increase following the implementation of a scheme, it must be that the increase is due entirely to an increase in legitimate o¤shore investment, for illegal o¤shore investment must fall.
Tax Revenue
Does the introduction of a scheme increase the expected net revenue of the tax authority?
Proposition 4 The expected net revenue collected by the tax authority from the set of taxpayers T is increased by the introduction of a scheme:
Proof. As the choices of taxpayers in T OF F make the tax authority indi¤erent between auditing and not-auditing (both with and without a scheme), it is straightforward to show that, in equilibrium, R S OF F (y) = R N S OF F (y) = 0. Hence, using (5) and (10), we have
where k 2 fN S; Sg. The result then follows from the inequalities in Lemma 3.
The intuition for Proposition 4 is that the increased propensity to either invest onshore, or o¤shore legally, raises the level of voluntary compliance. This increase in expected revenue is not o¤set by reductions in …ne revenue as the …rst-mover advantage enjoyed by taxpayers permits them to make choices that leave the tax authority just indi¤erent between auditing and not auditing, both with and without a scheme.
Were we to have assumed that the tax authority could choose the scheme parameters before investors make their investment choice, the …nding that net revenue increases under a scheme would be unsurprising. As, however, we take the tax authority to move last, the implications for net revenue were initially uncertain. It is notable, therefore, that even when moving last, voluntary disclosure schemes still increase net revenue.
In practice, the increase in expected revenue identi…ed in Proposition 4 may be an understatement. Whereas we consider a tax authority unfettered in its choice of …ne rate from the interval [f ; f ], in many cases it is only in prescribed circumstances can the tax authority levy the lowest and highest allowable …ne rates. 16 In such cases, failing to respond to a disclosure opportunity and/or making a false disclosure, may provide grounds for applying higher …ne rates than would otherwise be applied in the absence of a scheme.
Taxpayer Welfare
We now examine the impact of a scheme for expected taxpayer consumption (utility):
Proposition 5 The welfare consequences of introducing a scheme are as follows:
16 In the UK, for instance, the …ne rate that is applied is conditional upon the "behavioral" nature of the observed non-compliance: the lower bound applies if the non-compliance is judged to be through "careless error", whereas the upper bound applies to "deliberate and concealed"inaccuracies (see, e.g., HMRC, 2012).
(ii) For taxpayers belonging to
, where the right-side holds by Lemma 3; (iii) As C ON is una¤ected by a scheme, taxpayers who invest o¤shore in the absence of a scheme but switch to investing onshore in the presence of a scheme must switch to a lower payo¤.
Part (i) of Proposition 5 is for taxpayers who invest onshore irrespective of the provision of a scheme: such taxpayers are wholly una¤ected. Part (ii) states that taxpayers who invest o¤shore irrespective of the provision of a scheme lose consumption in the presence of a scheme. This loss arises as the probability that taxpayer investing o¤shore decides to do so illegally is lower in the presence of a scheme. Thus, with a higher probability, the taxpayer loses consumption on account of paying tax on the lump-sum. Part (iii) is for taxpayers for whom the introduction of a scheme induces a switch from investing o¤shore to investing onshore. Given that the payo¤ to investing onshore is unchanged, it must be that C N S OF F > C ON C S OF F , in which case switchers are switching for a lower level of expected consumption, but nonetheless a higher level than they would achieve by continuing to invest o¤shore.
The loss of utility to investing o¤shore illegally appears desirable -after all, it is due to a reduction in incentives for breaking tax law. More generally, were we to model explicitly the bene…ts from taxation in the form of the public services it pays for, the increased tax revenue generated by schemes would generate utility for all taxpayers through increased provision.
Optimal Incentivized Fine Rate
For tax authorities seeking to understand the optimal design of disclosure schemes it is of interest to highlight a feature of the optimal scheme relating to the question of how to set the incentivized …ne rate for those that enter the scheme. We have the following result:
Proposition 6 In the optimal scheme it holds thatf = f :
Proof. Using the relationship Q(f ; y) = I Q(f ; y) established in Section 6, and substituting
1 from Lemma 2, the result obtains.
According to Proposition 6, the incentivized …ne rate is the lowest …ne rate allowed under legislation. This is consistent with the design of disclosure schemes in the UK, which have o¤ered those who disclose the minimum ten percent penalty permitted in law. This result arises as the tax authority does only the minimum level of auditing necessary to ensure truthful disclosure by taxpayers within the scheme. To achieve this, the tax authority maximizes incentives for truthtelling by lowering the …ne rate for truthful disclosure to its lower bound.
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Conclusion
Tax authorities around the world are using incentivized voluntary disclosure schemes (IOVDS) to recover tax on o¤shore investments. Such schemes o¤er discounted …ne rates for those who voluntarily disclose (albeit in the shadow of the threat of subsequent enforcement). The amounts of revenue being recovered through such schemes are considerable, and international initiatives such as the OECD Common Reporting Standard are expected to result in the further use of such schemes. Given these developments, we appraise the use of such schemes, and their implications for tax authorities and for taxpayers.
A key feature of the voluntary disclosure schemes we examine is that they are conceived and implemented following an information leakage, which necessarily post-dates the criminal act. Accordingly, at the time of designing the scheme, the tax authority perceives no opportunity to in ‡uence criminal behavior, merely to try and recover as much of the uncollected revenue as possible. A second key feature is the recognition that neither is o¤shore investment in itself illegal, nor is all o¤shore investment driven by tax considerations.
We consider an environment in which taxpayers can invest a lump-sum onshore or o¤shore. Should they choose to invest o¤shore, they may do so legally or illegally. After investments have been made, the tax authority may potentially observe the o¤shore investments, but does not observe which were made legally, and which illegally. In this context, we …nd that the tax authority can increase its expected net revenue by implementing a disclosure scheme, rather than by simply using its regular audit regime. In particular, a hallmark of the optimal disclosure scheme is that it o¤ers the minimum allowable …ne rate in law to those that disclose honestly. Although the implementation of disclosure schemes is consistent with a rise in o¤shore investment, importantly our model predicts that the illegal component of o¤shore investment is always lower in the presence of a scheme. Thus, in a sense our model helps makes precise, it is possible to o¤er ex-post inducements for truthful disclosure without simply incentivizing the underlying criminal activity.
We note that our study represents a …rst step in the theoretical analysis of disclosure schemes and o¤er the following suggestions for future research. One extension would be to introduce risk aversion. This would require the use of simulation methods, or the simpli…cation of other aspects of the model, however. A second possible extension would be to allow for the possible sheltering of interest in o¤shore accounts, alongside the possibility that the source capital may also be untaxed. Third, imperfect audit technology might be allowed for, as in Rablen (2014) . Last, communication between a¤ected taxpayers through a network, as in Hashimzade et al. (2014) , might be introduced. Each of these avenues would further enrich the modelling and potentially provide new insights for those in tax authorities who design such schemes. The equilibrium partition of (w,b) space into sets ON and OF F , with and without a scheme.
